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INTRODUCTION
In the case of City of Oberlin v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC or Commission), the D.C. Circuit ruled FERC failed
to adequately address the reasons underlying its decision that it is lawful
under Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act (NGA) “to credit demand for
export capacity in issuing a Section 7 certificate to an interstate pipeline.”1 
In its remand order, the court directed FERC to expound on its decision
and show how “under the Takings Clause, and [court precedent] it is
lawful to credit precedent agreements with foreign shippers toward a
finding that an interstate pipeline is required by the public convenience
and necessity under Section 7 of the [Natural Gas] Act.”2 
More specifically, the D.C. Circuit took issue over two Canadian
precedent agreements where a new domestic pipeline would also service
Canadian customers.3 The court acknowledged FERC’s authority to issue
certificates of public convenience in “interstate commerce” does not
include certificates issued in “foreign commerce.”4 Section 7 of the NGA
“states that the Commission may issue a certificate of public convenience
and necessity for ‘the transportation in interstate commerce,’ § 717f(c)(2)
(emphasis added), and [the D.C. Circuit] explicitly refused to ‘interpret
1. City of Oberlin v. FERC, 937 F.3d 599, 606 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
2. Id. at 611.
3. Id. at 603.
4. Id. at 606–07.
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632021] NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ARE NECESSARY
‘interstate commerce’’ within the context of the Act ‘so as to include
foreign commerce.’”5 Presuming FERC did not have the authority, the
court ruled when FERC conducted its public benefits versus adverse
effects balance analysis,6 it should have considered whether a substantial
decrease in dekatherms (the amount of heat energy which is equal to one
million British thermal units) resulting from removing the Canadian
precedent agreements could affect its decision to grant the certificate.7 As
a consequence, the court remanded the case to FERC to further explain
“why it is lawful to credit precedent agreements for export toward a
Section 7 finding that an interstate pipeline is required by the public
convenience and necessity.”8 
True, Section 7 does not explicitly include “foreign commerce,” but
read in context with the intent of the statute’s framers, it does not exclude
it either. Thus, it will be argued the reason to permit sales of natural gas to
Canada may lie in several parts of the NGA, including but not limited to:
(1) FERC’s broad authority to regulate just and reasonable rates within the
domestic gas market;9 (2) its prohibition from discriminating against
imported natural gas from countries the United States has in place a free
trade agreement;10 and, (3) its exclusive authority over liquified natural
gas (“LNG”) terminals that import or export natural gas from foreign
countries.11 
Americans are constantly innovating, including in the energy sector of
the economy. Shale fracking is one of those areas of innovation. As a
reason to grant a certification in cases like Oberlin and permit sales to
foreign countries such as Canada, FERC could deduce the probability that
increased shale fracking could lead to an oversupply of natural gas, which
left unchecked could negatively affect prices of domestic natural gas.
Advanced technology in shale gas fracking produced an abundance of
natural gas, more than 600 trillion cubic feet, and significant revenues
from the practice continue to attract states that have not yet opened their
doors to fracking.12 Theoretically, a sharp increase in fracking can lead to
5. Id. at 606–07.
6. Id. at 602.
7. Id. at 606; Definition of Dekatherm, LAW INSIDER, https://www
.lawinsider.com/dictionary/dekatherm [https://perma.cc/WT7A-2ZBH] (last
visited Oct. 22, 2020).
8. Id. at 611.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (2018).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(b).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e).
12. How is Shale Gas Produced?, ENERGY.GOV, https://www.energy.gov/
sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/how_is_shale_gas_produced.pdf [https://perma.cc/8
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64 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
an imbalance of supply and demand and saturate the market with an excess
of natural gas.13 As the singular regulatory authority, FERC should be
concerned, because if there is too much supply of natural gas and not
enough demand, domestic gas prices would depreciate to a point where it
would be unprofitable for businesses to produce natural gas through shale
fracking, which eventually would lead to higher consumer prices.14 This,
in turn, could have a deleterious effect on the nation’s economy, since
shale gas produces 69% of the dry natural gas15 and natural gas consists of
32% of the energy sector.16 Thus, in order to have an efficient marketplace
for natural gas, supply and demand need to be in harmony with each other,
and, as this Article will argue, FERC has the statutory responsibility to
maintain that balance.
This Article attempts to provide a solution to FERC’s dilemma in
cases like Oberlin, but also presents a broader argument that FERC has
inherent authority to regulate exports and imports of foreign natural gas,
provided there is a connection with interstate transport of natural gas.
Since FERC has the statutory authority to regulate and monitor wholesale
sales and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce,17 it logically
follows that the power to grant a certification to build a pipeline supplying
foreign markets with natural gas fits squarely within FERC’s overall
mandate to ensure an efficient interstate market. Selling to foreign
MA7-BR54] (last visited Sept. 1, 2020); see also FED. ENERGY REGULATORY
COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN 2018–2022 (Sept. 2018), https://www.ferc.gov
/sites/default/files/2020-04/FY-2018-FY-2022-strat-plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T9ZM-8GZQ].
13. Carolyn Davis, Oversupply, Demand Stagnation to Strangle Long-Term
U.S. Natural Gas Prices, Says Morgan Stanley, NGIS DAILY GAS PRICE INDEX
(Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/115920-oversupply-
demand-stagnation-to-strangle-long-term-us-natural-gas-prices-says-morgan-stan
ley [https://perma.cc/2NJH-G8GL].
14. Id. (“U.S. natural gas is about to enter a cycle of structural oversupply
and demand stagnation, which in turn should reduce prices, according to Morgan
Stanley.”).
15. How Much Shale Gas is Produced in the United States?, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=907&t=8 [https://perm
a.cc/27VJ-QGHN] (last updated Sept. 11, 2020).
16. U.S. Energy Facts Explained, Consumption & Production, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/us-energy-facts/ [https://per
ma.cc/RK9X-732B] (last updated May 7, 2020).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z (2018); What FERC Does, FERC.GOV, 
https://www.ferc.gov/about/what-ferc/what-ferc-does [https://perma.cc/2F56-N7
6X] (last visited Sept. 11, 2020).
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652021] NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ARE NECESSARY
markets, therefore, may be the most practical way to maintain stability in
domestic natural gas prices.
National economic policy has shaped the way the country is moving
toward energy independence.18 Exporting natural gas is the most logical
answer to hedge against the risk of oversupply in domestic natural gas. If
the domestic market was saturated with natural gas, it could have an
adverse effect in maintaining just and reasonable rates of domestic natural
gas. Building domestic pipelines that could both service domestic and
foreign markets could prove to be the best way to prevent oversupply, as
overseas demand is expected to increase forty percent over the next twenty
years.19 
Part I of this Article reviews the statutory and regulatory background
of the NGA, beginning with the Commerce Clause, which gives
Congress—and ultimately FERC—the power to regulate interstate and
even foreign transportation and sales of natural gas. Part II discusses the
Oberlin case and argues it is well within FERC’s broad authority in
regulating interstate commerce to permit wholesale sales to foreign
shippers. Servicing foreign customers is merely an indirect effect of FERC 
taking action to stabilize domestic gas prices. Finally, Part III concludes it
is lawful for FERC to credit precedent agreements with foreign shippers
as part of the basis to certify building a publicly convenient and necessary
interstate pipeline under Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act.
I. FERC HAS AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE TRANSPORTATION AND 
SALE OF FOREIGN NATURAL GAS WITHIN THE DOMESTIC 
MARKETPLACE
A. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution Grants 
Congress Broad Power to Regulate Interstate Commerce and Trade with 
Foreign Nations.
In theory, FERC’s authority is derived from Congress’s commerce
power, its takings power, and its ability to make laws that are necessary
and proper to execute its enumerated powers within the Constitution. The
18. President Trump’s Energy Independence Policy, THE WHITE HOUSE
(Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-
trumps-energy-independence-policy/ (“President Trump’s Executive Order lifts
job-killing restrictions on the production of oil, natural gas, and shale energy.”).
19. Huileng Tang & Akiko Fujita, Natural Gas Oversupply Will Not Last 
Forever: Industry Executives, CNBC (Apr. 3, 2017, 11:02 PM), https://www
.cnbc.com/2017/04/03/natural-gas-oversupply-will-not-last-forever-industry-exe
cutives.html [https://perma.cc/9GCH-WX3V].
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  70 2/25/21  8:40 AM












   
 
  










      













      
  





66 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
Department of Energy and FERC, both parts of the Executive Branch,
have jurisdiction over foreign and domestic sales of natural gas through 
the enactments of Congress. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United
States Constitution gives broad authority to Congress to: “regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the
Indian tribes.”20 As the Supreme Court reaffirmed in National Federation
of Independent Business v. Sebelius, that authority is shared with the
states.21 In principle, Congress’s authority to regulate commerce surrounds
whether a business activity is transactional, or involves actual buying and
selling.22 Certainly trade in natural gas is contemplated under the
Commerce Clause.
But simply having the power to regulate natural gas markets is not
enough. Since a certification of public convenience and necessity will
involve the transportation of natural gas, it follows that privately-owned
land would be taken for public use. Although the Founding Fathers could 
not envision gas pipelines or electric grids, or even a railroad that could
transport energy across state lines, they understood natural law recognized
a balance between the common good’s right to property and an
individual’s right to the same. Under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, therefore, Congress through the NGA empowers FERC to
take private land for public use at times to transport natural gas in interstate
commerce.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
21. 567 U.S. 519, 554 (2012).
While Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause has of course
expanded with the growth of the national economy, our cases have
“always recognized that the power to regulate commerce, though broad
indeed, has limits.” Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968). The 
Government’s theory would erode those limits, permitting Congress to
reach beyond the natural extent of its authority, “everywhere extending
the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex.” The Federalist No. 48, at 309 (J. Madison). Congress already
enjoys vast power to regulate much of what we do. Accepting the
Government’s theory would give Congress the same license to regulate
what we do not do, fundamentally changing the relation between the
citizen and the Federal Government.
Id. (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968); THE FEDERALIST NO.
48, at 309 (James Madison)).
22. Id. at 550–52 (For example, the Court held the Affordable Care Act’s
individual mandate was designed to help stabilize the health insurance market and
could not be sustained under the Commerce Clause because it did not involve
commercial activity. The “activity” Congress seeks to regulate under its power
must be commercial in nature.).
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672021] NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ARE NECESSARY
Finally, the Necessary and Proper Clause activates Congress’s broad 
authority to regulate interstate commerce and engage in foreign trade,
because the Constitution grants it the power to “make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” their enumerated
powers.23 Both regulating interstate commerce and engaging in foreign
trade are enumerated powers. The NGA is the statute passed under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause that gives broad authority to FERC to
regulate energy markets, and as argued below, includes the import and
export of natural gas.
Even though these statements of general principle enumerated in the
Constitution regarding Congress’ commerce power, takings power, and
ability to create federal statutes are simple and clear, the interpretation by
the courts as to the scope of that power is not without controversy and begs
the question as to how much authority do courts say FERC has to grant
certifications of public necessity involving exports of natural gas. To
understand that, it is necessary to review how courts over time treated the
Commerce Clause.
One can visualize the history of the Court’s interpretation of the
Commerce Clause as a swinging pendulum between simple federal border
control of trade among the states to broader interpretations, where
Congress could do the unthinkable and meddle with a citizen’s private land
in an effort to expand its commerce power. As will be explained, the
culmination of these judicial rulings tends toward a broader interpretation
that in the end will help FERC in cases like Oberlin retain more control
over the export market as it relates to granting domestic pipeline
certificates.
Beginning with the landmark case of Gibbons v. Ogden where the 
Court looked at the “bigger picture” of Congress’s economic policy
responsibility, the Court held Congress is permitted under the Commerce
Clause to control “intrastate” activity, as long as that activity involved a
larger interstate commercial regulatory scheme.24 That power was
expanded in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., where the Court held
that Congress could regulate intrastate commerce as long as state
legislation had a “substantial relation” to interstate commerce.25 This
nebulous phrase, “substantial relation,” which does not appear in the
words of the Constitution, left the door open for courts to move the
pendulum from simply regulating trade among the states, or in other
words, “border control,” to possibly regulating all trade within a state
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
24. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 238–40 (1824).
25. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US 1, 32 (1937).
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68 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
based on whether state activity had a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce. The New Deal in the late ‘30s and early ‘40s and the
Court’s rulings during that period moved the pendulum further, prompting
more expansion of Congress’s commerce power by the Court. Wickard v.
Filburn26 was the “most far-reaching example of Commerce Clause
authority over intrastate activity,”27 and arguably, the most controversial.
In Wickard, the Court upheld a government program designed to
control the price of wheat sales. A farmer was penalized for exceeding his
quota of wheat by growing some for his own consumption.28 The Court
ruled against the farmer, who argued Congress had no authority to regulate
how much wheat he could grow on his own farm.29 It reasoned, permitting
the farmer to grow wheat for his own use (a non-commercial activity)
allowed him the opportunity to avoid purchasing wheat in the
marketplace.30 Moreover, if the farmer decided to sell the extra wheat into 
the marketplace that also could work against what the government was
trying to do to control the price of wheat. But there was no showing by the
government that the farmer did either.
The Court further reasoned, although growing wheat on the farmer’s
property for personal use was noncommercial activity when considering
the potential of other farmers doing the same, that noncommercial activity
in the aggregate could have had a “substantial economic effect” on the
interstate market for wheat.31 Therefore, “it is within Congress's power to 
regulate [a market] by supporting its price. [And] price can be supported
by increasing demand as well as by decreasing supply.”32 The same could
be said of FERC’s authority in regulating domestic sales of natural gas to
include sales to foreign markets to support “prices,” as will be discussed
below.
Fast forward fifty-three years and contrast Wickard with United States
v. Lopez, where the Court swung the pendulum back, narrowing
Congress’s authority in favor of Tenth Amendment states’ rights, and
finding a federal law prohibiting the possession of a firearm (another
noncommercial activity) within a school zone was unconstitutional.33 In
Lopez, the Court held the “possession” of a firearm involved no buying
and selling, and therefore, restricting such conduct was outside of
26. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
27. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
28. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114–15.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 127–29.
31. Id.
32. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 552–53 (2012).
33. See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
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692021] NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ARE NECESSARY
Congress’ power to regulate commerce.34 The Court ruled possession laws
of this type were instead within the power of the states to regulate and to
expand federal power in this manner “would require [the Court] to
conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not
presuppose something not enumerated and that there never will be a
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. This [the
Court was] unwilling to do.”35 
But later in the case of Gonzales v. Raich, the Court reversed position
again, in essence reaffirming Wickard, and held the state-sanctioned
growing and possession of medical marijuana for personal use can be
preempted by federal statute based on Commerce Clause grounds.36 The
Court reestablished the broad scope of Congress’s commercial regulatory
activity to include controlling what individual citizens do with their
property: “Our case law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate
purely local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”37 In sum, whether the 
regulation involves commercial “activity,” as upheld in the more recent
case of NFIB v. Sebelius, appears to be the touchstone to any Commerce
Clause analysis: “As expansive as our cases construing the scope of the
commerce power have been, they all have one thing in common: They 
uniformly describe the power as reaching ‘activity.’”38 
Thus, in analyzing FERC’s administrative power over energy markets
and how far that power stretches, it is worth noting Justice Thomas’s
unequivocal dissent in Raich, which describes the Court’s centurial,
historical interpretation of the amorphous and malleable boundaries to
Congress’s commerce power. Essentially, Justice Thomas finds under the
Commerce Clause’s text, history, and secondary sources such as the
Federalist Papers, the power is limited to the “selling, buying, and
bartering, as well as transporting” and not “productive activities,” such as
“manufacturing and agriculture.”39 He opined that “Congress may regulate
interstate commerce, not activities that substantially affect interstate
34. Id. at 561 (“Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has 
nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms.”); see also NFIB, 567 U.S. at 550 (“The 
power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to
be regulated. If the power to ‘regulate’ something included the power to create it,
many of the provisions in the Constitution would be superfluous.”).
35. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68.
36. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
37. Id. at 17.
38. NFIB, 567 U.S. at 551.
39. Raich, 545 U.S. at 58.
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70 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
commerce, any more than Congress may regulate activities that do not fall
within, but that affect, the subjects of its other Article I powers.” 40 
Focusing mostly on trade, Justice Thomas noted that the Court “has
never held that Congress can regulate noneconomic activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce.”41 To have such a nebulous,
expansive view of the Commerce Power, Justice Thomas concluded:
“[T]he Federal Government may now regulate quilting bees, clothes 
drives, and potluck suppers throughout the 50 States. This makes a
mockery of Madison's assurance to the people of New York that the
‘powers delegated’ to the Federal Government are ‘few and defined,’
while those of the States are ‘numerous and indefinite.’”42 
Aside from the fact Justice Thomas and the legal scholars and judges
who agree with him are correct that the Constitution does not give
Congress such broad power, the case law up to this point provides, at
minimum, that Congress can regulate “intrastate” economic activity that
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce and may also include
foreign trade that could affect interstate commerce. Thus, under the
analysis above, the Department of Energy, and through its authority to
delegate power to FERC, has broad authority from Congress to regulate
domestic and foreign sales of natural gas, and under the Takings Clause
also has broad authority to take private property in furtherance of
maintaining efficient energy markets.43 
40. Id. at 67.
41. Id. at 68–69.
42. Id. at 69. Currently, the chasm created between Raich and Lopez places
users of medical marijuana, as well as recreational users, in violation of federal
law, even though states permit it. Although the Executive Branch is within its
right to prosecute those violating federal law by consuming and using marijuana,
it uses its inherent discretionary authority not to do so, provided states are
effectively enforcing their statutes. See David Stout & Solomon Moore, U.S. 
Won’t Prosecute in States That Allow Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/20/us/20cannabis.html [https://perm
a.cc/VFP7-T4RZ]. 
43. Nicholas Lansfeldt & John Echeverria, Energy Infrastructure Siting
Authority, VT. J. ENVTL. L., http://vjel.vermontlaw.edu/topten/energy-infra
structure-siting-authority/ [https://perma.cc/GN53-E28F] (last visited Sept. 1,
2020) (“At the national level, natural gas companies granted licenses to construct
pipelines by FERC have long exercised broad authority to take rights of way using
the eminent domain power under the Natural Gas Act. This year, however,
pipeline opponents have filed lawsuits in federal district court challenging the use 
of eminent domain to construct the proposed Mountain Valley and Atlantic Coast
natural gas pipelines. The litigation raises the question of whether the use of 
eminent domain to support these projects violates the ‘public use’ requirement of
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712021] NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ARE NECESSARY
B. The NGA Grants FERC Jurisdiction Over the Transportation and 
Wholesale Sale of Natural Gas and The Department of Energy Over 
International Sales.
It is clear that the regulation of interstate commerce and foreign
commerce is expressly within Congress’s authority. Generally, these are 
“two distinct ideas,” and therefore, “‘[i]nterstate commerce’ does not
include foreign commerce, unless Congress by definition for the purposes
of a particular statute includes them both in the single expression.
Congress has frequently done that,”44 and has done so in the NGA.
Section 3 of the NGA vests primary authority in the Department of
Energy to regulate “both the movement of gas across the United States
border and the sale of gas over the border.”45 Section 3 provides for a
“public interest” standard for the export of natural gas.46 Moreover, any
export of natural gas to countries that have a free trade agreement with the
United States are per se within the public interest and require no delay in
granting an application for either import or export.47 Under Section 7 of
the NGA, the “public interest and necessity” standard requires “an 
examination of the border price, the need for gas, the security of supply,
the effect on the U.S. balance of payments, the effect on domestic supplies
and other factors.”48 
Sections 4, 5, and 7 of the NGA provide for the transportation of all
gas from across the border and into the United States, including wholesale
sales in interstate commerce.49 The Department of Energy Organization
Act vested authority in regulating imports and exports to the Secretary of
Energy.50 As a result, FERC has derivative authority over imports and
exports of natural gas if the Secretary of Energy delegates that authority
the Takings Clause, and whether Congress has made an overbroad delegation of
the eminent domain power to FERC and in turn to private natural gas
companies.”).
44. Border Pipe Line Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 171 F.2d 149, 150 (D.C.
Cir. 1948).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2018); Robert C. Platt, Trade in Natural Gas: The
Changing Regulatory Framework, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 415, 416, 418 (1989)
(“Prior to October 1977, all authority under the Natural Gas Act was vested in the 
Federal Power Commission (FPC). The Department of Energy Organization Act
(DOE Act) transferred responsibility for gas imports and exports from the FPC to
the Secretary of Energy.”).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 717b.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(c).
48. Platt, supra note 45, at 417.
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717d, 717f.
50. Platt, supra note 45, at 418.
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72 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
to it.51 Therefore, under the Oberlin fact scenario, FERC can derive that
authority from the Secretary of Energy.
II. FERC HAS BROAD POWER TO CREDIT PRECEDENT AGREEMENTS
WITH FOREIGN SHIPPERS SERVING FOREIGN CUSTOMERS AS EVIDENCE 
OF MARKET DEMAND FOR AN INTERSTATE PIPELINE
A. Review of City of Oberlin v. FERC – The DC Circuit Gives a “Nod” 
to FERC to Credit Foreign Precedent Agreements When Evaluating 
Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity.
The Oberlin case provides a set of circumstances that behooves FERC
to create a policy goal that maintains equilibrium between domestic supply
and demand. The policy can include the transportation of natural gas in
interstate commerce for export. The issue in Oberlin surrounded a
certificate of “public convenience and necessity” granted to NEXUS Gas
Transmission, LLC (Nexus), pursuant to Section 7 of the Natural Gas
Act.52 The pipeline in question consists of:
an approximately 256-mile, 36-inch interstate natural gas
transmission pipeline designed to transport up to 1.5 billion cubic
feet per day (Bcf/d) of cleaner-burning natural gas from receipt
points in eastern Ohio to existing pipeline system interconnects in
southeastern Michigan. The full path of NEXUS allows for the
delivery of natural gas supplies directly to consumers in northern
Ohio; southeastern Michigan; and the Dawn Hub in Ontario,
Canada.53 
According to the company, the purpose of the pipeline is to provide
affordable, clean-burning natural gas to its customers.54 In granting the 
certificate, FERC also determined through an Environmental Impact
Statement the “adverse environmental impacts [of the pipeline] would be
51. Id. at 418–19; 42 U.S.C. § 7172(f) (“No function described in this section
which regulates the exports or imports of natural gas or electricity shall be within
the jurisdiction of the Commission unless the Secretary assigns such a function to
the Commission.”).
52. Brief for Respondent FERC at 1, City of Oberlin v. FERC, 937 F.3d 599
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1248, 18-1261), 2019 WL 1435081, at *1.
53. NEXUS Overview & Map, NEXUS GAS TRANSMISSION, https://www
.nexusgastransmission.com/content/nexus-overview-map [https://perma.cc/D76
H-5MBP] (last visited Sept. 1, 2020).
54. Id.
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732021] NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ARE NECESSARY
reduced to less-than-significant levels by avoidance, minimization, and
mitigation measures.”55 
FERC uses a “multi-step” analysis “to balance anticipated growth for 
natural gas against concerns about overbuilding, subsidization by existing
captive customers, and unnecessary exercise of eminent domain.”56 In
deciding whether to grant a certificate, FERC first looks to whether the
pipeline can proceed without “subsidies from existing customers.”57 
Second, it considers the impact of the new project on the “applicant’s 
existing customers,” competing pipelines and their “captive customers,”
and “landowners and surrounding communities.”58 Then, FERC “balances
any residual potential adverse economic effects against a project’s public
benefits.”59 It looks at the benefits that “accrue” from the proposed
pipeline itself and “not from the end-use of the transported gas.”60 
FERC also looks at the balance of the public benefits versus the
adverse effects by focusing on “economic interests such as landowners’
property rights” using a “sliding-scale” analysis.61 During the
examination, FERC considers evidence of market demand necessity and
the presence of “precedent agreements” for “most of the new capacity”
and how those would be viewed as “‘strong evidence’” of market
demand.62 The “public convenience and necessity” analysis further
includes a National Environmental Policy Act analysis, or “NEPA”
analysis, to consider the environmental impact of a project.63 
The Nexus project “intended to provide up to 1.5 million dekatherms
per day” of natural gas to service customers in northern Ohio, southeastern 
Michigan, and the Dawn Hub in Canada.64 Nexus submitted it had “eight
long-term contracts (precedent agreements) for fifty-nine percent of the
capacity (855,000 dekatherms per day)” provided by the pipeline.65 The 
55. See Brief for Respondent FERC, supra note 52, at 2.
56. Id. at 6.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 7 (“Public benefits may include ‘meeting underserved demand,
eliminating bottlenecks, access to new supplies, lower costs to customers,
providing new interconnects that improve the interstate grid, providing
competitive alternatives, increasing electric reliability, or advancing clean air
objectives.’”).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 8.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 9.
64. Id. at 11.
65. Id.
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74 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
breakdown of the 885,000 was DTE Gas and DTE Electric company
serving end-users in the United States at 200,000 dekatherms per day.66 
Other domestic users totaled 425,000 dekatherms per day with the
remaining going to Canadian customers at 260,000 dekatherms per day.67 
After applying the above criteria, FERC granted a conditional
certificate of public convenience and necessity, finding there was “a
market need for the new pipeline,” and considering the environmental
impact of the project, the order was “an environmentally acceptable
action.”68 Several parties requested a rehearing that FERC essentially
denied.69 As to the Canadian exports, it decided those exports did not
“detract from . . . [a] finding of domestic need.”70 Furthermore, FERC
“determined that the Project—which is located entirely within the United
States, receiving gas in Ohio and delivering it in Ohio and Michigan—is 
not an export facility requiring approval under section 3 of the Natural Gas
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f, for which eminent domain would not be
available.”71 Finally, it decided the project met the requisite safety
guidelines and did not pose a public risk.72 
In its argument before the D.C. Circuit, FERC reminded the court of
its “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, asserting “the grant or
denial of a section 7 certificate is within the Commission’s discretion” and
a court cannot “substitute its judgment for that of the Commission.”73 
FERC has “broad discretion to invoke its expertise in balancing competing
interests and drawing administrative lines.”74 A court is limited to deciding
whether FERC “considered relevant factors” and whether there was clear
error.75 
In the outset of its ruling, the D.C. Circuit admitted while “reasoned
justifications” for an agency’s actions are required for review, a court
cannot “micromanage” the agency.76 The court acknowledged the
separation of powers between the executive branch and the judiciary and
agreed that FERC is the expert authority.77 The petitioners, the City of
66. Id.
67. Id. at 12.
68. Id. at 15.
69. Id. at 16.
70. Id. at 17.
71. Id. at 18.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 19–20.
74. Id. at 20 (internal quotation omitted).
75. Id.
76. City of Oberlin v. FERC, 937 F.3d 599, 601 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
77. Id.
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752021] NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ARE NECESSARY
Oberlin, Ohio, and the Coalition to Reroute Nexus, an organization of
landowners, moved the court to vacate FERC’s order to certify the pipeline
and vacate the order denying a rehearing on the matter.78 In short, the court
remanded for FERC’s “further explanation of this determination” without
vacatur.79 
The court acknowledged Congress passed the NGA to facilitate
abundant supplies of natural gas at reasonable prices.80 Under this 
statutory mandate, FERC has broad authority to certify a pipeline to 
transport natural gas sales to Canada, as long as it is maintaining the
balance of domestic supply and demand of natural gas at reasonable prices.
This is consistent with its oversight authority and its directive to maintain
just and reasonable rates. Moreover, due to the increased production of
shale fracking, disallowing exports would lead to an overflow of supply
and depreciated prices, which in the long run could cause the reverse
where there is a lack of supply of natural gas, because it is not profitable
to produce it anymore, and an increase in demand. The court then set forth
FERC’s policy as to how it considers applications and what it requires for
a certificate of public convenience and necessity.81 This also includes an
environmental review.82 
The D.C. Circuit recognized FERC’s authority over the import and
export of natural gas. Under Section 3, no one can import or export natural
gas to any nation without FERC’s order, which will only be granted if the
trade with a foreign nation is in the “public interest.”83 Although Congress
“transferred Section 3’s regulatory function to the Secretary of Energy[,] .
. . the Secretary delegated back to the Commission the narrow authority to
approve or disapprove the construction and siting of facilities where 
natural gas will be imported or exported.”84 The issue in the Oberlin case
surrounds the precedent agreements servicing Canadian customers.
FERC approved Nexus’s application on three grounds: (1) its
precedent agreements were “best evidence” of a market demand for gas;
(2) FERC approved its fourteen percent return on equity, provided “Nexus
design its initial customer rate based on a hypothetical capital structure of
50% equity and 50% debt;” and, (3) there is no public safety risk by 
building the pipeline.85 Deferring to FERC’s rationale and expertise, the
78. Id.
79. Id. at 601–02.




84. Id. at 602–03.
85. Id. at 603.
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76 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
district court granted Nexus’s condemnation action and permitted it to
exercise eminent domain and “condemn certain easements,” on the
Petitioners’ properties.86 Under D.C. Circuit jurisprudence, landowners 
have standing to seek redress in the courts if they are “put to the choice”
of either agreeing with a pipeline to access their property or in turn have
the property condemned.87 
Due to the unique expertise that administrative agencies have, courts
have limited authority over agency decisions, and generally, can only set
aside an order, or in this case, a certification for a pipeline, if the agency’s
decision is a result of circular reasoning, that is, “arbitrary and capricious”
or “contrary to law.”88 Therefore, under 15 U.S.C. 717r(b) when
exercising its authority to grant a certificate, FERC has to weigh the issues,
explain its decision in an adequate manner, and base its findings on
“substantial evidence.”89 The Petitioners argued the precedent agreements
Nexus provided and FERC relied upon in granting the certification as “best
evidence” are not “substantial evidence.” They attacked the certification
on three grounds.
First, Petitioners claim FERC contradicted its own policy when it 
accepted the precedent agreements as representing fifty-nine percent of
“most of the new capacity” when it was not new capacity and therefore
not representative of a “strong market demand.”90 The court, however,
disagreed. FERC’s policy is not a “bright line rule,” but naturally, a
flexible standard allowing the “Commission to consider a wide variety of
evidence to determine the public benefits of the project.”91 The court
accepted FERC’s rationale that the pipelines already in place could not
handle the amount of gas required by the precedent agreements; therefore,
since there was more demand than the existing pipelines could support, a
certification to build a new one was justified.92 
The second argument was that the precedent agreements lacked
“meaningful evidence” of the pipeline’s need “because half of them are
86. Id.
87. Id. at 604 (“As a result of the Commission’s orders [petitioner] . . . must
either sell its land to [the pipeline] or allow [the pipeline] to take its property
through eminent domain. . . . That [the pipeline] ultimately will compensate
[petitioner] for its property does nothing to erase [petitioner’s] legally cognizable
injury.” (alteration in original) (quoting B&J Oil & Gas v. FERC, 353 F.3d 71, 75
(D.C. Cir. 2004))).
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772021] NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ARE NECESSARY
with affiliates of the pipeline’s sponsors.”93 To the court, this argument
also lacked merit because FERC found no evidence of “self-dealing,” and
Nexus “bears the risk for any unsubscribed capacity.”94 The court noted
FERC’s policy of not “looking behind” precedent agreements “to make
judgments about the needs of individual shippers.”95 
Finally, the third argument raised the issue as to whether FERC had
given adequate explanations for granting the certificate to include sales to
Canada. The Petitioners’ contended “Nexus’s precedent agreements
[were] not strong evidence of market demand because a substantial portion
of them are dedicated for export.”96 Since Section 3 authorizes the
Secretary of Energy to export natural gas, the Petitioners argued, FERC
“may not use precedent agreements for export ‘to justify project need
under Section 7 . . . which governs certificates for projects in interstate
commerce.”97 The Petitioners’ strongest argument against the certification
is on eminent domain grounds. They assert:
because Section 7 confers on a certificate holder the right to
exercise eminent domain, crediting export agreements toward a
Section 7 finding of project need runs afoul of the Takings Clause,
as a private pipeline selling gas to foreign shippers serving foreign
customers does not serve a ‘public use’ within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment.98 
Yet, if the Petitioners and the court are correct, then the Secretary of
Energy and FERC cannot allow any export of natural gas because it could
involve taking American private property for “foreign” public use. If this
were the constitutional standard, it would eviscerate both Congress’s
interstate commerce regulatory authority and foreign commerce
negotiating authority, and in turn, FERC’s derivative authority under the
NGA to execute those powers.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 605–06 (“[A]s the Commission explained, when it ended its policy
of requiring pipelines to demonstrate a specific subscription rate, ‘it was reducing
“the significance of whether the [precedent agreements] are with affiliated or
unaffiliated shippers.”’” (alteration in original) (quoting Certification of New
Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities, 88 FERC 61,227, 61,748 (1999))).
95. Id. at 606 (quoting Myersville Citizens for a Rural Community, Inc. v.
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78 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
There were two precedent agreements at issue totaling 260,000
dekatherms per day going to Canadian customers.99 The court reasoned
that if FERC “excluded these agreements from its Section 7 analysis of
project need, Nexus would have [contracts] for only 625,000 dth/day, or
approximately 41.6% of its 1.5 million [capacity].”100 Since FERC did not
consider whether the public benefits of the pipeline were outweighed by
any adverse impacts if the line were “only subscribed for 625,000 dth/day
(a substantial decrease from the analyzed 805,000 dth/day),”101 the court
remanded for further explanation. According to the court, it could “affirm
its finding of public convenience and necessity only if the Commission’s 
inclusion of the export precedent agreements in its analysis was proper.”102 
The court did not believe FERC adequately explained why it was
lawful for it to permit the pipeline to utilize it for export, more particularly,
“why it is lawful to credit demand for export capacity in issuing a Section
7 certificate to an interstate pipeline.”103 FERC responded to this assertion 
that: “(1) a substantial amount of the pipeline’s subscribed capacity is for
domestic consumption; (2) all shipper commitments have secondary
delivery rights within the United States; and (3) Nexus’s application listed
eleven interconnections with potential customers.”104 But the court was not
satisfied. It held the facts presented did not explain why FERC would
permit a pipeline based on precedent agreements with “foreign shippers
serving foreign customers.”105 
The court emphasized it “explicitly refused” to interpret “interstate
commerce” to include commerce with foreign nations, such as Canada.106 
However, there is no Supreme Court precedent holding that the NGA
completely bars FERC from including foreign sales in granting a
certificate for a new pipeline. In addition, the court was not satisfied with
FERC’s response to the eminent domain dilemma—whether it is lawful to
take an American citizen’s property to service some Canadian citizen.107 
Relying on a prior case, FERC argued allowing the building of a new 
pipeline based on export agreements does not “present a Takings Clause
problem,” because once FERC determines the project is needed for public








106. Id. at 606–07.
107. Id. at 607.
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792021] NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ARE NECESSARY
right of eminent domain.”108 FERC also argued Congress did not suggest
a “further test” was needed, that is, “certain certificated pipelines furthered
a public use . . . while others did not.”109 The court did not agree that this 
fully answered the question of whether Section 7 authorizes the use of
eminent domain in circumstances where FERC credits precedent
agreements for export in a finding a “pipeline is required by the public
convenience and necessity.”110 
Finally, the court rejected Petitioners’ last two arguments, one where
FERC approved a formula Nexus used to establish its initial rate, and the
other, concerning whether the pipeline poses a safety risk. For the first
argument, the court found FERC appropriately balanced both consumer
and investor interests when it ordered Nexus to design its initial rate on a
50:50 debt to equity ratio, “since new pipelines are inherently riskier, and
Nexus bears the responsibility for any unsubscribed capacity.”111 As to the
pipeline’s safety, the court held that FERC did not act arbitrarily when it
relied on Nexus’s promise to comply with safety standards as provided by
the Department of Transportation (DOT), which has full authority to
oversee and establish safety standards for the building of pipelines.112 
Merely relying on Nexus’s commitment to obey DOT standards was not
an abrogation of FERC’s NEPA’s obligations.113 Furthermore, the court
held that FERC did not fail to consider the proximity of the pipeline to
residences and other buildings when DOT regulations do not require
minimum distances.114 
But the “nod” the court gives to FERC’s approval of the pipeline based
on crediting Canadian precedent agreements is supported by the fact the
court did not vacate FERC’s certification approving the pipeline outright,
which was already in the process of being built. Instead, the court was
looking for further explanation. Furthermore, Judge Rogers’ concurrence
acknowledges that FERC is within its statutory authority to grant a
certification of public convenience and necessity when imported gas is
used for domestic consumption, or in other words, to satisfy domestic
demand. Judge Rogers suggested a “workaround” could be applied,
provided if FERC explained why it would consider precedent agreements




111. Id. at 608–09.
112. Id. at 610.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 611.
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80 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
exclusively within the United States. 115 A “market need” is a broad phrase
and, as argued here, could mean sales of gas to Canada to maintain stable
market prices.
Supporting this notion, in footnote 3, the court disagreed with the
Petitioners’ assertion that FERC could “never lawfully issue a Section 7
certificate where a pipeline has precedent agreements for export.”116 In
fact, the court disagreed “because a pipeline may clearly be required by
the public convenience and necessity independent of any of its precedent
agreements for export. But, as explained, [FERC] has not made any
finding to that effect in this case.”117 This footnote opens the door to FERC
making an “independent” argument that crediting the Canadian precedent
agreements satisfies a market need to maintain stable domestic prices and
supplies of natural gas.
B. FERC Has Broad Authority to Maintain the Balance of Supply and 
Demand of Natural Gas in Interstate Commerce and May Grant
Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity Based in Part on
Precedent Agreements with Foreign Shippers.
Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress can give broad
authority to the Department of Energy and FERC to regulate both domestic
and foreign trade in natural gas. The Court has “been very deferential to
Congress's determination that a regulation [or a statute, such as the NGA]
is ‘necessary.’”118 It “upheld laws that are ‘convenient, or useful’ or
‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’”119 The Court,
however, has held “unconstitutional those laws that undermine the
structure of government established by the Constitution.”120 Statutes
“which are not ‘consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the constitution,’
are not ‘proper [means] for carrying into Execution’ Congress’s
enumerated powers. Rather, they are, ‘in the words of The Federalist,
‘merely acts of usurpation’ which ‘deserve to be treated as such.’”121 
In addition, the Department of Energy and FERC’s authority to
regulate all energy markets is further broadened under the Takings Clause
of the Constitution.122 The government can seize private property for
115. Id. at 611–12 (Rogers, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 607 n.3.
117. Id.




122. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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812021] NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ARE NECESSARY
public use provided it is taken with just compensation.123 This assumes
under natural law a balance between individual rights to private property
and the common good.124 In the controversial case of Kelo v. City of New 
London, the Court interpreted the Fifth Amendment to give the
government expansive authority where the government was justified in
using eminent domain to seize private property for a private development,
provided the local community was benefitted through economic
development.125 Again, this is a broad authority and undercuts Petitioners’
argument that the Takings Clause always prohibits government use of
private land that has an indirect effect of benefiting foreign citizens.
The Oberlin court “pressed” the issue during oral argument as to why
it is “lawful” for it to credit precedent agreements involving sales to
foreign markets.126 FERC responded that when it approved the Nexus
application that it was “‘looking at the benefits to domestic markets,’” but
the court held this had “no explanatory value.”127 Measuring benefits to
domestic markets is the proper answer, but FERC should have included
the broader argument that those sales are necessary to maintain stable
domestic prices.
1. Exports of Natural Gas Are Vital to Maintaining Equilibrium in
Domestic Natural Gas Prices and May Justify Taking Property to 
Service Foreign Nations. FERC Must Weigh the Direct and Indirect
Effects of Its Eminent Domain Actions.
Both the interstate commerce clause and the foreign commerce clause
are like two hands: Sometimes they work independently of each other and
sometimes together, but they always work toward benefiting the American
consumer. When deciding whether FERC is acting arbitrarily (or any
agency for that matter) a court should look at FERC’s intent and the direct
and indirect effects of its actions, especially when it exercises its eminent
domain power.
With regard to the Canadian sales, FERC satisfied its Section 3 public
interest test and its Section 7 public convenience and necessity test.
Canadian export sales, as part of a larger, national policy to export natural
gas, are within the public interest because they keep domestic prices stable.
123. Id.
124. Alex Tuckness, Locke’s Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHIL. (Jan. 11, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/ [https://
perma.cc/3H6D-XY5S].
125. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
126. City of Oberlin v. FERC, 937 F.3d 599, 607 (2019).
127. Id.
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82 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
In addition, the new pipeline created to transport gas meets the public
convenience and necessity standard, even though the gas transported
through it will ultimately service Canadian customers. The pipeline, in 
fact, services both domestic and Canadian users.
The general standard for appellate review over FERC’s orders is
whether FERC acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner when deciding
whether to grant a certificate of public convenience and necessity to
construct a pipeline.128 FERC does not act arbitrarily if it grants a
certificate to build a pipeline that services primarily domestic users, but
also some to foreign users. Measuring both the direct and indirect effects
of building a new pipeline is the essence of FERC’s analysis including, for
example, when it is analyzing environmental impact. There is an ancient
philosophical construct, namely the “principle of double effect,” that
evaluates the direct and indirect effects of an action. The Supreme Court
has used this principle in the past to adjudicate constitutional cases
involving First Amendment law, civil rights law, and criminal law.129 
An analysis under the “principle of double effect”130 supports
government action (in this case, FERC and its surrogates) to take private
property to service foreign customers, as long as those sales benefit the
domestic consumer market. The “principle of double effect” focuses on
the intent of the actor and permits a good and just action if taking that
action produces two effects: one intended and foreseen, and the other
unintended and foreseen. This analysis will be applied to the Oberlin case 
below.
In Oberlin, the D.C. Circuit’s unease over the possibility of exercising
eminent domain and taking an American citizen’s property to service a
foreign customer is misplaced. It is misplaced because servicing a foreign
customer through using a domestic pipeline is an unintended indirect
effect of crediting precedent agreements with Canada for a domestic
benefit. Instead, crediting agreements for export has beneficial direct
128. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. FERC, 616 F.3d 520, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(“We review FERC's orders under the arbitrary and capricious standard and
uphold FERC's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence.” (quoting
Am. Gas Ass’n v. FERC, 593 F.3d 14, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2010))).
129. Edward C. Lyons, In Incognito—The Principle of Double Effect in
American Constitutional Law, 57 FLA. L REV. 469, 508–43 (2005).
130. AUSTIN FAGOTHEY, RIGHT AND REASON 107–08 (3d ed. 1963) (There are
four elements under the principle of double effect: “(1) the act to be done must be 
good in itself or at least indifferent; (2) the good intended must not be obtained
by the means of the evil effect; (3) the evil effect must not be intended for itself
but only permitted; and (4) there must be a proportionally grave reason for
permitting the evil effect.”).
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832021] NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ARE NECESSARY
effects: (1) it keeps the supply of gas in check and thereby preventing
depreciated domestic prices harming the American consumer; (2) it yields
a positive contribution to the balance of payments between the U.S. and
foreign nations; (3) it satisfies an international demand for American
natural gas; (4) it increases domestic activity and job growth through shale
gas production; (5) it has geopolitical benefits, including agreements made
between the United States and foreign nations to rectify decades of trade
imbalances; and, (6) it also improves infrastructure. In the Oberlin
scenario, the direct domestic benefits to the American consumer by
crediting the export agreements to Canada simply outweigh the indirect
benefits to Canadian consumers.
Moreover, given the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the
authority granted to Congress (and through Article II to FERC) under the
interstate commerce clause, FERC can credit foreign precedent
agreements as long as there is a connection with balancing interstate
domestic prices and supplies of natural gas. FERC has broad authority to
regulate gas prices and just and reasonable rates within the domestic gas
market.131 “Just and reasonable” rates should not just apply to approving
tariffs. In the context of the rest of the statute, the language is broad enough
to mean maintaining an efficient natural gas market, ensuring American
consumers receive as much gas they need at reasonable prices.
In addition, under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, FERC has anti-
manipulation authority over the wholesale sale of natural gas, and implied
in this authority is maintaining an efficient market.132 To underscore this
notion that FERC has an interest in maintaining an efficient market, in its
staff white paper on market fraud, FERC states: “Market manipulation
threatens the integrity of the energy markets . . . by harming consumers,
[and] rendering prices and price setting mechanisms inaccurate and
unreliable . . . [where manipulating schemes have] wreaked havoc on 
energy markets.” 133 The “integrity of the markets” also means maintaining
equilibrium in supply and demand of natural gas, even if it means creating
131. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (2018).
132. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594; 16 U.S.C.
§ 824v(a) (2018) (“Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation” under FPA); 16
U.S.C. § 825o-1 (penalty authority of $1,000,000 per day per violation under the
FPA); 15 U.S.C. § 717c-1 (“Prohibition on Market Manipulation” under NGA); 
15 U.S.C. § 717t-1 (penalty authority of $1,000,000 per day per violation under
the NGA).
133. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, STAFF WHITE PAPER ON ANTI-
MARKET MANIPULATION ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS TEN YEARS AFTER EPACT 
2005, at 13 (2016), https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/marketman
ipulationwhitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5EJ-E2DV].
350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd  88 2/25/21  8:40 AM





     
 
     













     
    
 
 
      
 
 
   
  
   
 
    
   
    
    
 
       
   
 
   
   
84 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. IX
a pipeline that can service both domestic customers and exports. If
maintaining market equilibrium is not a stated FERC policy, perhaps it
should be so.
There is another reason to allow using a domestic pipeline for exports. 
FERC cannot discriminate against imported natural gas from countries
where the United States has a free trade agreement in place, 134 such as
Canada. But the converse should also be true—that FERC should not
discriminate against “exporting” natural gas to any country where the
United States has an agreement in place. Finally, since FERC has
exclusive authority over LNG terminals that import or export natural gas
from foreign countries, then it should follow it also has authority over
crediting precedent agreements for export.135 
2. Both the Trump and Obama Administrations Adopted Policies to 
Support Shale Fracking and Promote the Export of Natural Gas to 
Foreign Nations.
President Trump, in his speeches and policies, seeks to boost
production and sales of natural gas abroad.136 President Obama also saw 
the importance of shale fracking both in aiding the environment and 
helping the nation’s economy.137 A recent U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
report indicated the importance of shale fracking and what a “devastating”
effect it would have for the country if it were banned.138 More particularly,
its Global Energy Institute predicted that without shale fracking, the
country would suffer “catastrophic” economic impacts, including but not
limited to: 19 million jobs lost; an increase in gasoline prices; a giant leap
in household energy bills by 324%; “cost-of-living impacts to residential
consumers in Wisconsin and Michigan,” growing from $4,700 to $5,100
per household between the years 2021 and 2025; and, possible economic
ruin of oil and gas producing states, such as New Mexico, Texas, Ohio,
Colorado, and Pennsylvania.139 Clearly, exports of natural gas are
134. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(b).
135. Id.
136. Kevin Freking, Trump Pushes ‘America First Energy Policy’ on
Louisiana Trip, AP NEWS (May 14, 2019), https://apnews.com/b75911009
f0e4982b6557ccbb588f357 [https://perma.cc/E8BN-Q2LC].
137. Jude Clemente, President Obama’s Support for America’s Shale Oil and
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important to maintaining equilibrium in domestic prices of natural gas and
are necessary to keep domestic supply levels in check.
CONCLUSION
Shale fracking technology gave the United States an abundance of
natural gas and exporting it has major benefits. According to one study,
“for every 1 Bcf/d of shale gas production, approximately 32,000 total jobs
are supported throughout the economy.”140 Exports “could contribute as
much as $10 billion to $31 billion per state to the economies of natural
gas-producing states.”141 And states that do not produce natural gas will
also “benefit from increased demand for steel, cement, equipment, and
other goods.”142 
In order to have a vibrant natural gas market, demand and supply need
to be in harmony with each other. If there is too much supply and not
enough demand, the result is depreciated prices to the point where it would
become unprofitable for anyone to produce natural gas through shale
fracking. This could damage a key component of the nation’s energy
industry, which is why exports are necessary.
Both the Trump administration and the Obama administration
confirmed that by increasing exports of natural gas, natural gas markets in
the United States will be in “balance.”143 Moreover, since natural gas is a 
greater value good, exporting it will benefit the U.S. economy because the
country can, in turn, import larger quantities of goods than it could if it
dedicated resources to producing something less in value than natural
gas.144 
140. AM. PETROLEUM INST., LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS EXPORTS – AMERICA’S 





143. Effect of Increased Levels of Liquefied Natural Gas Exports on U.S.
Energy Markets, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 29, 2014), https://
www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/fe/ [https://perma.cc/46MS-4BCP] (“Natural gas 
markets in the United States balance in response to increased LNG exports mainly
through increased natural gas production.”); NERA ECON. CONSULTING,
MACROECONOMIC OUTCOMES OF MARKET DETERMINED LEVELS OF U.S. LNG
EXPORTS (Jun. 7, 2018), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/06/f52
/Macroeconomic %20LNG%20Export%20Study%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc
/4VDA-Y6YP].
144. NERA ECON. CONSULTING, supra note 143, at 38; see also The 
Economics of Natural Gas Exports, BARNETT SHALE ENERGY EDUC. COUNCIL, 
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FERC, as the sole regulator of energy markets in the United States, 
has the responsibility to maintain equilibrium between domestic supply
and demand to ensure just and reasonable rates for consumers. It has the
constitutional, statutory, and moral authority to do so. Therefore, under
Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, FERC may credit precedent agreements
with foreign shippers as part of the basis to certify building a publicly
convenient and necessary interstate pipeline that services both domestic
and foreign customers.
http://www.bseec.org/_the_economics_of_natural_gas_exports [https://perma.cc
/54PN-H2NN] (last visited Sept. 11, 2020) (“The experts at NERA found that
LNG exports would produce net economic benefits for the U.S. across a range of
possible natural gas price changes. In all cases, benefits increased as LNG exports
increased.”).
